

# I'm the Security Lead

(...and I'm here to help)

# \$ whoami

The Signal logo features the word "SIGNAL" in a red, sans-serif font. A blue circle is positioned behind the letter "A", with a small registered trademark symbol (®) to the right of the word.

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A solid red vertical bar is located to the right of the address text.

“Signal is the global leader in cross-channel marketing technology. Thousands of brands and digital agencies around the world rely on Signal’s patented technology to transform data into insights and engage with customers across the web, mobile devices and beyond – all in real time.”


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(We're an advertising technology company)

```
$ cat /etc/motd
```

Traditional “infosec” concerns and responsibilities are in many ways compatible with DevOps.

Success has social and technical elements.

I’ll tell you a (true!) story about my ongoing journey, abstracting lessons I think are generally applicable.

# \$ cat /etc/issue

As a newcomer to the neighborhood, successfully making friends involves observation, humility, trust-building, and contributing to (and subsequently influencing) shared goals.

Actions speak louder than words, but acting *properly*, like speaking politely, depends on unwritten rules.

Identifying these values is the first step to success.

Imposing external values leads to misery.

# \$ locate values

- ✓ Continuous value delivery
- ✓ Changing requirements are welcome
- ✓ Deliver working code as quickly as possible
- ✓ Business involvement
- ✓ Culture of trust
- ✓ Face-to-face interaction
- ✓ Progress measured by working code
- ✓ Constant pace (not death march, not idling)
- ✓ KISS
- ✓ Team self-organization
- ✓ Continuous, organic, process improvement

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# DevOps



- ✓ Continuous value delivery
- ✓ Changing requirements are welcome
- ✓ Deliver working **systems** as quickly as possible
- ✓ Business involvement
- ✓ Culture of trust
- ✓ Face-to-face interaction
- ✓ Progress measured by **tested systems**
- ✓ Constant pace (not death march, not idling)
- ✓ KISS
- ✓ Team self-organization
- ✓ Continuous, organic, process improvement



# Activity Flow



git



That was easy...so let's add some security




...but not the wrong kind!





# Activity Flow - Including Security Elements



# Security tests as part of CI Pipeline


- ▶ Triggered by “normal” activity (e.g. smoke test)
- ▶ Uses scriptable tools, e.g. gauntIt, with built-in support for:
  - ▶ arachni (sometimes run thru a Burp proxy)
  - ▶ curl
  - ▶ dirbuster
  - ▶ sqlmap
  - ▶ ...

# GauntIt - gauntIt.org

Uses attack scripts written in Gherkin.

Makes it easy to write tests - housekeeping is done for you.

Since our non-security tests use Cucumber, my stuff “fits in”, and I can find local help. *This is big for me!*

A terminal window titled "Downloads" showing a Gherkin test script. The script is written in green text on a black background. It starts with a command to cat a file named "cookies.attack". The script content includes a feature description, a scenario, given conditions, a table for a profile, a when clause with a command, and a then clause. The terminal prompt is a green dollar sign followed by a cursor.

```
$ cat cookies.attack
@reallyslow @final
Feature: Look for cross site scripting (xss) using arachni against a URL

Scenario: Using arachni, look for insecure cookie use and verify no issues are found
  Given "arachni" is installed
  And the following profile:
    | name          | value                                     |
    | url           | http://control.ci2.example.com         |
  When I launch an "arachni" attack with:
  """
  arachni --http-proxy=192.168.111.111:8082 --checks=insecure_cookies <url>
  """
  Then the output should contain "0 issues were detected."
```

# arachni - [www.arachni-scanner.com](http://www.arachni-scanner.com)

Extensive Ruby framework for web app pen-testing and security evaluation.

directory\_listing,  
backup\_directories,  
interesting\_responses,  
allowed\_methods,  
localstart\_asp,  
common\_directories,  
private\_ip,  
hsts,  
captcha,  
insecure\_cookies,  
mixed\_resource,  
emails,  
html\_objects,  
cookie\_set\_for\_parent\_domain,

password\_autocomplete,  
credit\_card,  
http\_only\_cookies,  
unencrypted\_password\_forms,  
cvs\_svn\_users,  
form\_upload,  
ssn,  
backdoors,  
http\_put,  
backup\_files,  
common\_files,  
origin\_spoof\_access\_restriction\_bypass,  
xst,

htaccess\_limit,  
webdav,  
rfi,  
xss\_dom,  
path\_traversal,  
xss\_dom\_script\_context,  
xss\_dom\_inputs,  
csrf,  
no\_sql\_injection\_differential,  
sql\_injection\_differential,  
xss\_path,  
xpath\_injection,  
code\_injection,  
xss\_event,

code\_injection\_timing,  
xss\_tag,  
unvalidated\_redirect,  
sql\_injection,  
os\_cmd\_injection\_timing,  
session\_fixation,  
ldap\_injection,  
source\_code\_disclosure,  
os\_cmd\_injection,  
sql\_injection\_timing,  
response\_splitting,  
no\_sql\_injection,  
file\_inclusion,  
xss\_script\_context,  
xss,

Many checks! Easy to incorporate in gauntlet attack scripts

Example scripted check for multiple issues: CSRF, XSS, Cookie problems, invalidated redirects, stray files, etc.

```
Downloads
$ cat combined.attack
@reallyslow @final
Feature: Look for various issues as an unauthenticated user

Scenario: Using arachni, perform multiple unauthenticated checks and verify no issues are found
  Given "arachni" is installed
  And the following profile:
    | name          | value                                     |
    | url           | http://app.ci2.example.com |
  When I launch an "arachni" attack with:
    """
    arachni --checks=allowed_methods,backup_files,unencrypted_password_forms,webdav,xst,cv
s_svn_users,private_ip,backdoors,htaccess_limit,html_objects,mixed_resource,cookie_set_for
parent_domain,csrf,path_traversal,unvalidated_redirect,xss,xss_path,xss_event,xss_tag <
url>
    """
  Then the output should contain "0 issues were detected."

$
```

# Benefits

- ✓ Issues are found before customers can experience them.
- ✓ Smaller units of remediation work facilitate flow
- ✓ Use of existing tools/techniques means security work “fits in”



# Tech Ops Activity Flow



git



“Configuration as code”

Enforce DSC  
despite random  
perturbations



{ local  
dev  
ci  
prod }

# Challenges

- Complexity/dependencies —> Slowness —> WIP
- Common mechanism —> Speed, but with LCD capabilities

# Choices

- Degree to which heterogeneity is tolerated
- Address complexity via architecture (e.g., microservices)?

# Audit Considerations

## Change Management

- Fine-grained audit logs due to automation.
- Standard (pre-authorized) changes.
- Same way, every time.
- Config as code + code review = all config changes reviewed

## Least Privilege

- Automation —> *fewer* ppl, doing *fewer* things manually

## Asset Management/CMDB

- Comes “free” with infrastructure automation!

“But Chris, we’re not an Agile/DevOps shop...”

Yeah, but you can influence that...

- “Go DevOps” with a low-risk POC
- Introduce influencers to DevOps ideas
  - Bring *The Phoenix Project* to the office

# Credits

Mordac: <http://search.dilbert.com/comic/Mordac%20The%20Preventer>

Agile: <http://agilemanifesto.org/principles.html>

DevOps Principles: <http://theagileadmin.com/2010/10/15/a-devops-manifesto/>

Easy Button: [http://www.staples-3p.com/s7/is/image/Staples/s0105150\\_sc7?\\$splssku\\$](http://www.staples-3p.com/s7/is/image/Staples/s0105150_sc7?$splssku$)

Jenkins logo: <http://jenkins-ci.org/>

git logo: <http://twitter.com/jasonlong>

puppet logo: <https://puppetlabs.com/company/news/media-kit>

dice: <https://openclipart.org/detail/25207/two-red-dice>